China and India are touted as new entrepreneurship powerhouses. There are some well-founded rationales as well as a number of misinformed and ill guided viewpoints about the friendliness of environment to support entrepreneurship in each country as well as the China-India differences concerning entrepreneurial environment. This article contributes to this debate by offering theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the differences in regulative institutions in the two economies. Specifically, we compare the regulative, participative and supportive roles of the state from the standpoint of entrepreneurship in the two countries.
Introduction
China and India are touted as new entrepreneurship powerhouses. In a Zogby International's survey conducted among Americans, 49 % of the respondents said that China or Japan provide the "creative and entrepreneurial milieu required to form the world's next technological innovator" (America, 2007) . Likewise, because of its entrepreneurial performance in recent years, analysts consider India as "the next Asian miracle"
The literature is rife with claims and counter claims regarding the friendliness of environment to support entrepreneurship in China and India as well as the superiority of one country over another. First, consider China. One view is that China is "shifting from top-down, state-directed technology policies to more flexible, market-oriented approaches that foster innovation and entrepreneurship" (Segal, 2004) . Schramm (2004) considers China as the most spectacular example of a developing country that pays proper attention to what he refers as the four sectors of the entrepreneurial system -high-impact entrepreneurs, large mature firms, the government, and universities. The opposite argument is that the Chinese government has exercised its power over its firms in a "chaotic way", which has hindered entrepreneurship in the (Huang, 2008, p.32 ). country (Gilboy, 2004) . Petras (2008) argues that most Chinese billionaires "secured political influence through kinship ties" and grabbed or created assets by making a "deal" with "regional, provincial or municipal party officials" (p. 323).
A similar point can be made about India. It is argued that India is "shifting away from a legacy of state-dominated commerce toward a market-oriented system" (Stewart, May and Kalia, 2008, p. 85) . The country has set an "explicit policy objective to become a leading businessfriendly economy" (World Bank, 2008a) . Huang (2008) notes that India is "shedding [its] harmful legacy" and that politics in India has become "more open and accountable".
Bureaucratic barriers in the country, however, lead to longer lead times, higher costs, and reduced speed and flexibility for entrepreneurs to create and expand their ventures (Majumdar, 2004) . At the same time, influential entrepreneurs take advantage of various institutional holes in the country. Petras (2008) notes that most Indian billionaires built their wealth by "using economic power to secure neo-liberal policies" (p. 323). He goes on to say: "While many Indian publicists and economists hail the 'Indian miracle' and classify India as an 'emerging world power' because of the high growth rates of the past five years, what really has transpired is the conversion of India into a billionaire's paradise" ( There is also a disagreement among analysts as to Petras 2008, p. 323) .
which country has a more favorable and conducive environment for entrepreneurship. It is argued that democratic societies such as India are more likely to benefit from globalization (Bremmer, 2007) . Huang (2008) notes that, in a number of important areas, institutional reform has gained a higher momentum in India than in China. Likewise, India outperforms China on almost all of the World Bank's (2008) governance indicators ( Table 1 ). Chi Lo, the author of Phantom of the China Economic Threat, however, commented: "The biggest obstacle to India outperforming China is reform inertia" 1 (The International Economy, 2006) . India's most important barrier to entrepreneurship arguably centers on red tape and bureaucracies on the national and state levels (The International Economy, 2006) . Table 1 here Complex, poorly conceptualized natures of entrepreneurship landscapes in the two countries are highlighted in the above observations. In prior theoretical and empirical research, scholars have noted that contexts and environment play important roles in determining entrepreneurial behavior (FORA, 2006; Tan, 2002) . The operating environment for entrepreneurs is arguably more complex in emerging economies such as in India and China than in developing economies (Stewart, May and Kalia, 2008, p. 85) . In prior research, scholars have also found that entrepreneurs scan more frequently developing countries than in developed countries due to the complexity of the environment in the former group (Stewart, May and Kalia, 2008, p. 85) .
Current understanding of theorization regarding the difference in the entrepreneurial landscape in China and India is sketchy because little empirical work exists. Prior researchers have noted that institutional environments in developed and emerging economies differ substantially (see Stewart, May and Kalia, 2008 for review) . Nonetheless, little theory or research exists to explain cross-country comparison involving two or more developing economies. The purpose of our study is to fill this void.
In this paper, we compare different components of regulative institutions in China and India. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section examines how institutions are likely to influence entrepreneurship. Then, we compare regulative institutions in China and India from the standpoint of entrepreneurship. Next, we discuss the data, analysis and findings. Finally, we provide discussion and implications.
Institutions and Entrepreneurship
All economic phenomena arguably have institutional components and implications (Parto, 2005) .
In a larger sense, institutions are "macro-level rules of the game", which include formal constraints such as rules, laws, constitutions and informal constraints such as social norms, conventions and self-imposed codes (North, 1996) . Institutions in emerging economies are associated with "institutional voids" (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) .
The state is arguably the most important institutional actor and powerful driver of institutional isomorphism, since violations of laws and regulations can result in harsh sanctions (Bresser and Millonig, 2003; Groenewegen and van der Steen, 2007) . These are typically framed as regulative institutions in the institutional literature. Scott (1995 Scott ( , 2001 has proposed three institutional pillars--regulative, normative and cognitive. They can be mapped with "legally sanctioned behavior", "morally governed behavior" and "recognizable, taken-for-granted behavior" respectively (Scott et al. 2000, p. 238) . The focus of this paper is on regulative institutions. Regulative pressures are mostly associated with public agencies but they can also be exercised by private bodies such as trade and professional associations. Note that regulative institutions consist of "explicit regulative processes: rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities" (Scott 1995, p. 35 ). In the current context, regulative institutions consist of regulatory bodies (e.g., the governments in the two countries and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)) and existing laws and rules that influence the development of entrepreneurship.
Regulatory roles
By regulatory state, Sobel (1999) means a set of factors that influence the enforcement of contracts, the rule of law, the risk of expropriation, corruption of government, and bureaucratic quality. A country with a strong rule of law has "sound political institutions, a strong court system" and citizens are "willing to accept the established institutions and to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes" (International Country Risk Guide 1996) . Put differently, a strong rule of law is characterized by effective punishment to transgressors (Oxley and Yeung, 2001) . In overly politicized and less free states, which lack rule of law, entrepreneurial efforts are diverted away from wealth creation into non-market behavior entailing securing protection from market forces (Campbell and Rogers, 2007; Clark and Lee, 2005; Kreft and Sobel, 2005; Sobel, Clark and Lee, 2007) . In particular, recognition of contract law is important in producing trust in business transactions (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998; Nichols, 1999; Stiglitz and Squire, 1998) .
In many emerging economies, the rule of law is "often weakly developed" or sometimes "ignored with impunity" (Bratton, 2007) . Factors related to weak rule of law such as corruption, and the effectiveness of legal system in enforcing contracts act as barrier to entrepreneurship (Sievers, 2001 ) . Most obviously, because of ineffective legal enforcement of private property rights, entrepreneurs have to acquire political and administrative protection or depend upon informal norms for security (Yang, 2002) . A lack of mechanisms related to the protection of intellectual property and discouraging monopolies and unfair trade practices also hinder entrepreneurship (Schramm, 2004) . Kreft and Sobel (2005: 604) forcefully state:
Creative individuals are more likely to engage in the creation of new wealth through productive market entrepreneurship. In areas without these institutions, creative individuals are more likely to engage in attempts to capture transfers of existing wealth through unproductive political entrepreneurship.
Participatory roles
The term "participatory state" captures the extent to which policies and institutions represent the wishes of the members of society (Sobel, 1999) . In such a state, businesses participate in the national policy making arena through "dialogue, litigation, and mimesis" (Edelman and Suchman, 1997) . Prior research indicates that business groups can work closely with state agencies to protect their independence and autonomy (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) .
In some situations, particularly when business groups are strong, the nation will collaborate with them in rationalizing different activities (Scott, 1992, p. 211) . Business groups are also involved in a "highly interactive process of social construction", which influences the practical meaning of a law-in-action (Edelman and Suchman, 1997) .
Supportive roles
Of equal importance in the discussion of regulative institutions that follows below is the state's supportive role. In this regard, it is important to note that many emerging economies, new businesses face a host of barriers such as burdens related to tax systems and bureaucracy, absence of relevant commercial laws, 'dysfunctional' financial markets and a lack of know-how.
Different theoretical contributions and various empirical studies have led to the accepted view that the government can attack barriers to entrepreneurship related to skills, information, market and infrastructures by legal and non-legal influences. Scholars examining the development of information and communications technology (ICT) industry have identified these influences in the form of new laws, investment incentives, foreign technology transfer, and other supply-push and demand-pull forces (King et al., 1994; Montealegre, 1999) . For instance, Singapore has developed itself as an ICT hub of Asia by providing attractive infrastructure, skilled workers and a stable labor environment which attracted a large number of ICT firms to locate there (Kraemer et al., 1992; Wong, 1998) . Similarly, strong university-industry linkages and a large pool of highly trained scientists and engineers have driven the development of ICT industries in Israel (Porter and Stern, 2001 ). Table 2 compares China and India on various indicators related to entrepreneurship. Table 3 presents major events related to institutional reforms in China. Chinese politics was arguably the most liberal in the 1980s (Huang, 2008) . The 1989 Tiananmen events was one of the biggest roadblocks facing Chinese entrepreneurs. It is argued that, in the 1990s, the Chinese state reversed the gradualist political reforms (Huang, 2008) .
Regulative Institutions: A Comparison of China and India
Major events related to institutional reforms in India are presented in Table 4 . India started relaxing industrial regulation in the early 1970s, trade liberalization began in the late 1970s, the pace of reform picked up significantly in the mid-1980s (Panagariya, 2005) . Indian entrepreneurship, however, got a big boost following the economic liberalization started in 1991 (Table 4 ). The pre-1991 reforms were "introduced quietly and without fanfare" (Panagariya, 2005 ). Yet, having said this, it is apparent, too, that India's achievement on the entrepreneurship front is far from encouraging. Note that formalization of the informal sector is one of the important indicators related to impact of entrepreneurship in an economy (Ahmad and Hoffmann, 2008) . In this regard, estimates suggest that about 70% of nonagricultural workforce is informally employed in India (UNDP, 2004) . Consider another indicator related impacts of entrepreneurship--poverty reduction (Ahmad and Hoffmann, 2008) . According to the 2001 census, 30 % of the population in India lives on less than $1 a day, and 78 % lives on less than $2 a day (Baldauf, 2006) . There is thus very little progress in poverty reduction. 
Regulatory roles of the state
Notwithstanding the existence of some essential elements of a democracy, the Indian political system has become inherently "unaccountable, corrupt, and unhinged from the normal bench marks voters use to assess their leaders" (Huang, 2008) . Court systems are overburdened and thus are characterized by procedural delays, and red tape (Bhattacharjya and Sapra, 2008; Lancaster, 2003) . The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor's report, 'Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2004 Record -2005 noted: "poor enforcement of laws, especially at the local level, and the severely overburdened court system weaken the delivery of justice." According to the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center, there was a backlog of 23.5 million cases in 2002 (Lancaster, 2003) .
India's court system is decentralized and is largely administered by its states. Note too that national labor laws in India are administered at the state level (Deloitte, 2006) . The states have faced budget problems and have failed to comply with federal directives to hire more judges and upgrade legal infrastructures and court facilities (Lancaster, 2003) . One scholar noted: "Corrupted as they are by the party system, India's institutions are incapable of enforcing accountability. India's elites tolerate a level of poor governance and abuse of power that has led to the collapse of democracy elsewhere" 2 . Beyond all that, in India, there are groups that campaign in support of traditional values. Notwithstanding their supports to modern values, the Indian government and court system are forced to settle for compromise, which means a slower progress than they would like to see ( Baird, 1998) .
China's poor performance in terms of transparency, official accountability, and the rule of law is widely recognized in the literature (Economy and Segal, 2008; Liu, 2006) . There has been an absence of effective procedural and remedial mechanisms. Corruption in the courts has been an issue of big concern in the country (Liu, 2006) . It is important to note that the CCP's Political-Legal Committee, local party committees and local governments control personnel and funding in the courts (Liu, 2006 ). Yet, having said this, it is apparent, too, that China's shift toward the rule of law gained momentum in the 1990s (Fox, 2008) .
Regarding China's superiority over India, two further observations are worth making. In China, the base of regime legitimacy is shifting from MarxLeninism to economic growth (Chen, 2002; Zhao, 2000) . Chinese leaders have set economic growth as the top priority (Zhao, 2000) .
Moreover, many entrepreneurs in China equate rule of law with democracy (Chen, 2002) .
Second, China has more resources than India to perform the regulative functions. Based on above discussion, the following hypothesis is presented:
Participatory roles of the state : The state's regulatory role is more favorable to private businesses in China than in India.
India is the most populous democracy in the world. Democracy is inherently participative and collaborative. The existence of formal structures, even if they are not implemented in practice, represents at least symbolic actions (Kshetri, 2008) . Theorists argue that a symbolic actions lead to more substantive changes subsequently (Campbell, 2004; Edelman, 1990; Forbes and Jermier, 2002; Guthrie, 1999; Oakes et al., 1998) . The image that Indian government presents to external parties is a function of the power those parties have over the Indian government (Basu et al., 1999) . In line with these arguments, the following proposition is presented:
The state's participatory role is more favorable to private businesses in India than in China.
Supportive roles of the state
In China, the base of regime legitimacy is shifting from MarxLeninism to economic growth (Chen, 2002; Zhao, 2000) . Chinese leaders have set economic growth as the top priority (Zhao, 2000) . The CCP's survival largely depends upon its economic performance (Chen, 2002) . The Chinese government outperforms in infrastructure projects (Economy and Segal, 2008) . The post-Deng regime is only "rhetorically tied to Marxist ideology" (Chen, 2002) . The CCP expects that a richer economy might help burnish China's image worldwide and increase respect for it.
For that reason, Chinese government encourages entrepreneurship. China's successful blend of nationalism and Marxism (Shlapentokh, 2002) has provided impetus to entrepreneurship and investment. Most CCP leaders have realized that entrepreneurs' contribution to the ambitious economic agenda outweigh the costs related to the challenges to the CCP 's legitimacy. For this reason, they are wholeheartedly promoting and facilitating entrepreneurial thinking and practices. In sum, the private sector in China has more favorable environment to grow than in India (Chen, 2002) . The above leads to the following:
Data, Analysis and Findings
: The state's supportive role is more favorable to private businesses in China than in India. and assessments of the quality of public services (IFC, 2007) . We compared formal institutions related to the state's regulatory, participatory and supportive roles in the two economies.
Regulatory role
We begin by considering governments' regulatory roles in the two economies. Table 5 displays the results for the businesses' perception of their states' regulatory roles in terms of the court systems' efficiency in dealing with business disputes. We took question no. 11 in the WBES for this purpose 3 . It read: "In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country's court system to be." "Fair and Impartial", Honest/Uncorrupt", "Quick", "Affordable", "Consistent", "Decisions Enforced". In the "Always" (1) to "Never" (6) scale, the difference of means between India and China was statistically significantly (t = -1.72, p <.10) 4 . This indicates that businesses in China perceived their court system more favorably compared to those in India. Table 6 , 7, 8 here asked to rate "overall perception of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy and private firms". The item: "All in all, for doing business I perceive the state as" was measured in very helpful (1)-very unhelpful (5) scale for the central/national government as well as for the local/regional government. Moreover, the respondents were asked to rate their perceptions of governments at both levels for "now" and "three years ago". Table 6 presents businesses' perception of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy (Central/National level) and private firms "Now", that is, in 1999/2000. The difference between means of the two countries (India-China) was statistically insignificant (t= -0.53, p > 0.59).
In the same manner, businesses' perceptions of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy (Local/Regional level) and private firms are presented in Table 6 for "Now", that is, in 1999/2000. The difference between means of the two countries was statistically significant (t= -1.89, p <0.1).
Similarly, Table 7 presents businesses' perception of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy (Central/National level) and private firms "Three years ago", ", that is, in 1996/1997. The difference between the two countries was -0.373, which was statistically insignificant (t= 0.90, p <0.37). In the same manner, businesses' perceptions of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy (Local/Regional level) are presented in Table 3c for 1996/1997. The difference of means between the two economies was statistically significant (t= 2.48, p <0.05). Table 8 presents shifts in private firms' perception of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy with the Central/National level as well as at the Local/regional level. Indian private firms reported higher shifts than Chinese private firms at both levels. The difference of the mean between India and China at the Central/National level was statistically significant (t=-2.21, p <0.05). A similar point can be made about the shifts at the Local/regional level (t=--1.67, p <0.10).
Shift in businesses' perception of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy and private firms in the three year period

Supportive role
Question no. 7 stated 6
Discussion and Implications
: "Please judge on a four point scale how problematic are these different regulatory areas for the operation and growth of your business". Various areas included in the questionnaire are presented in Table 9 . In the No Obstacle (1)-Major Obstacle(4) scale, the difference of the means between the two countries was statistically significant (t = 5.85, p<.0001).
Table 9 here
Regulative institutions' role in promoting entrepreneurship is widely recognized in the literature.
"[T]he need to reduce regulatory and administrative burdens affecting entrepreneurial activity;
the increasing attention given by governments to entrepreneurship education and training; the need to ease SME access to financing, technology, innovation and international markets; …. and local policy issues" are emphasized among critical factors that influence SMEs' success (OECD, 2005) . These regulatory institutions, however, do not develop uniformly across all economies.
While there are some studies examining the China-India differences (e.g., Huang, 2008) , none does so in a way that quite serves the empirical objectives of this study. To the author's knowledge, these data provide the first comprehensive empirical documentation of the differences. The present study thus fills a large gap in the institutional and entrepreneurship literatures by providing clear and convincing evidence related to different elements of regulative institutions in the two Asian giants. This paper disentangled the components of regulative institutions in the two Asian giants and compared them. The data used in the paper are not recent ones. This is both its limitation and contribution. As noted earlier, the data capture businesses' perception of the effects of more than two decades of reforms on regulative institutions in China and India. There obviously is a need for research on more recent data in the two economies.
Further theoretical and empirical research is also needed to gain a better understanding of regulative institutions' impacts on entrepreneurship development in emerging economies. Future research based on the present framework can be extended to other emerging economies.
Regulative institutions' in China and India may differ across different industries. For instance, India outperforms China in some areas such as banking (Huang, 2008) . In future conceptual and empirical work scholars need to compare and contrast regulative institutions from the standpoint of specific economic sectors (e.g., banking, retailing, etc.).
Finally, as to the government's role in shaping entrepreneurship landscape in emerging economies, it is important to note that the government can do little to bring changes in informal institutions. In China, for instance, although formal institutions such as rules and laws are changing rapidly, some institutional actors such as decision makers in state-owned banks and other agencies, local cadres, tax officers and government officials (The Economist, 2002; Yang, 2002) are trapped in the socialist mindset. For instance, studies have reported Chinese societies' negative perception of those trying to build their own company (Harwit, 2002) and some people in the country consider entrepreneurs as "selfish, avaricious peddlers", or "getihu" (Hsu, 2006) .
In this regard, a comparison of informal institutions influencing entrepreneurship in the two countries might be worthwhile target of study. Source: World Bank (2008b) . π The score has a mean of zero, a standard deviation of one, and ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. A higher or positive value indicates a stronger rule of law. The Third Plenum of CCP 's 11th Central Committee emphasized on economic modernization and growth.
It was the beginning of market-oriented reforms in China although there was no specific announcement concerning private business. 1979 Deng Xiaoping announced that "to be rich is to be glorious".
1983-84
National campaigns against "spiritual pollution".
Entrepreneurs were publicly criticized (Tsai, 2006 (Tsai, ). 1987 National campaigns against "bourgeois liberalization".
Entrepreneurs were publicly criticized (Tsai, 2006 The first copyright law was enacted. 1991
The Ministry of Education authorized nine universities to award master's degrees in business (Ridgway 2005) .
This is an important step to facilitate the growth of cognitive entrepreneurship.
September 1992
Deng Xiaoping's famous southern tour. He called for a continuing of the reform effort.
It was a defining moment in China's transition to market. 1993 The government designed the first "grand strategy" of transition to a market economy, with an emphasis on a rulebased system and on the building of market-supporting institutions.
This was the turning point for private sector, despite the remaining plethora of China on the road to markets.
September 1997
In the Fifteenth Party Congress, private enterprise was recognized as an important component of the economy.
Arguably, the greatest change in official attitude toward private ownership. The forum also stressed the rule of law and its crucial role for a modern market economy to work well (IFC 2000 (IFC ). 1999 Constitutional amendment giving formal recognition to the private sector. October 1999 China adopted the Administrative Review Law.
The law gave entrepreneurs right to appeal an administrative decision.
July 2001
In CCP's 80th anniversary, President Jiang Zemin handed party membership to a capitalist.
He was the founder of the first private company to list on a foreign stock exchange (Pomfret 2001 
April 1987
The number of capital goods items on the OGL list expanded to 1,007. April 1988 The number of capital goods items on the OGL list expanded to 1,170. April 1990 The number of capital goods items on the OGL list expanded to 1,329 1991 The Government of India started the economic liberalization policy. 1994
The National Telecommunications Policy provided for opening cellular as well as basic and value added telephone services.
The private sector including foreign investors allowed to invest.
January 1995 India became a WTO member. December 7, 1999 The Indian Parliament passed the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Bill.
It established the agency and allowed private investment including foreign investors. o Chinese government provided more favorable environment than the Indian government.
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